C5 Corvette Development
At about the same time this announcement was made, the Corvette design team experienced a number of key personnel replacements. GM Design Vice President and Head of Corvette DesignCharles “Chuck” Jordan- who had largely controlled the early design variants of the C5 platform - retired and was replaced byWayne Cherry.
It was somewhat surprising that Cherry was chosen overJerry Palmer(current head of Chevy Three (the Corvette’s studio home since1974) and the man who was most responsible for theC4redesign.) AlthoughCherrywas officially made the head of the design department in September1992, his responsibilities centered far more heavily around business and corporate politics than it did art and design work.
It wasJerry Palmerwho ultimately remained in charge of GM studios and directly influenced the design elements of the C5. Later in the development of the car, Palmer would overseeJohn Cafaro, who had come to Corvette after working as chief designer on the 1993 Chevy Camaro. Ultimately it would be Cafaro who would oversee and directly manage the development of the C5. Additionally,John Heinricywas named assistant chief engineer. Lastly, a formal announcement was made namingDave Hillas the Corvette's Vehicle Line Executive.
As design programs go, the actual development of the C5 Corvette was as diverse and challenging as the rest of its evolution. WithCharles Jordannow at the helm, he instructed Cafaro to begin preliminary sketch designs of a C5 rendering. Cafaroset to work in the basem*nt of the Chevy 3 Design Studios.
Despite his efforts, many challenged his early designs and soGMexecutives turned to other firms as well including ACC in California - who were chiefly responsible for the development of the scintillatingSting Ray III. Jordanalso ordered Tom Peters who (at that time) worked withinGM’s Advanced 4 studioto become involved, thus making the design of the C5 Corvette a three candidate contest.
In April1991,Jordangave his blessing to one of Tom Peter’s designs but also directed all involved to blend in many ofCafaro’sideas. In late March,1992,Cafarocame back with his stunning “Black Car” which was based on theC4’s birdcage chassis but featured a completely new and exciting look. The aforementioned “Black Car” was in fact a prototype and test bed for the C5 Corvette. It featured much of the C5’s eventual design.
Perkinswas also responsible for shepherding C5 chassis development through GM’s economic hardships, first by creatively charging his work (often toC4projects) and later by carefully siphoning off just enough money to fund theCERV IVplatform.
In December1992, the Corvette design group secretly contracted with TDM, Inc. to build a prototype of the proposed C5 Corvette. Officially known as theCorvette Engineering Research Vehicle(or CERV IV) this concept ’Vette was kept secret from GM management out of real concern that GM would scrap the development of the $1.2 million dollar prototype. Although the CERV IV’s outward appearance was a “bastardized” C4 shell, underneath was a backbone chassis that incorporated a rear-mounted transmission - both of which were part of the C5 goals from the onset. Even the engine, which was supposed to feature a Gen III small block Chevy, ended up coming over from theC4assembly facilities. While the firstCERV IVwas really little more than a rolling chassis, it did well enough to impress the top brass withinGM.
In fact, the newly appointed Corvette Chief EngineerDave Hill(who replacedDave McLellanafter his retirement from GM in 1992) unveiled theCERV IVCorvette in May of1993atGM’s Technical Centerin Warren, Michigan. Until it’s unveiling, most of the hundreds of people who were in attendance were utterly unaware that any test car was already being built.
However, the potential of theCERV IVsold many ofGM’s top brass on the new C5 platform and encouraged some of the top executives - includingJack Smith- to move ahead with the design. With the renewed support of GM’s top brass behind them, the Corvette engineers set back to work on developing the C5 prototype.
In June,1993Dave Hill, who had come to lead the Corvette engineering team after an extended stint as an engineer for Cadillac, met with Corvette program manager Russ Mclean in an attempt to seek approval from the General Motors Strategy Board to begin formal development of the1997C5 Corvette program.
Shortly after meeting with the board (andJack Smith) the plan was fully endorsed and it was proudly announced byJim Perkinsthat the fifth-generation Chevy Corvette would be manufactured with a target date for its formal introduction to occur in the1997model year.
A number of new corporate mandates were issued that would not only change how the new Corvette was to be developed, but were also intended to help ensure that the C5 Corvette would appeal to a broader audience than its predecessors. Unlike the early years of the Corvette, when legends such asZora Arkus-DuntovandBill Mitchelldefined the expectations of the Chevy Corvette, the C5 would be the result of considerable market research and customer clinics.
Nearly 1,600 Corvette owners (as well as the owners of other competitive vehicles) received a survey that asked specific questions about their existing Corvette’s styling, automotive design, and available features that would/could be offered with a new generation car. While this type of undertaking had never been previously performed, the results were definitely favorable. Chevy’s “Voice of the Customer” listed specific preferences including a front-engine, rear-drive layout, with other options ranked in the following order of importance: 1.) quality construction, 2.) performance, 3.) safety, 4.) appearance, 5.) comfort, and 6.) value.
Handling and maneuverability were favored by many to be of greater importance than sheer acceleration. Additionally, one of the greatest complaints concerning earlier generation Corvettes was about to be resolved - namely the current issue surrounding the difficulty entering or exiting earlier generation Corvettes.
Early C5 design work envisioned a Corvette akin to theC4package size that featured swooping, dramatic lines that were reminiscent of the mid-engine Corvette Indy andCERV IIIconcept cars. Another strong consideration that was made, especially in the wake of rising gas prices and ever increasing federally mandated emission regulations, was to continue down the path conceived with the Stingray III concept - namely, to build a smaller, lighter car that might even feature a high-performance 6-cylinder engine.
Ultimately, these ideas were scrapped as it was generally agreed that these ideas were not consistent with what Corvette buyers were looking for in a sports car.
As development continued, a plunging, arrow-shaped nose theme became the popular design leader, although this design was ultimately re-directed away from the Corvette and became (in a more subdued form) part of the 1993 Chevy Camaro design platform. Despite this, some of the bodylines rendered in this variant of the C5 Concept took hold, and it seemed as though the new Corvette was beginning to take shape. Still, a number of ideas came and went - including a “double bubble” roof that carried through many of the early concept designs.
While this detail made it as far as being included in some of the clay models and full model concepts, it too eventually hit a dead-end and was dropped from the design. By May1993, the C5’s design had progressed to a form that seemed viable for construction. The car’s exterior styling was being influenced by aerodynamics and the aforementioned customer input. Corvette enthusiasts were adamant that the new Corvette should “look like a Corvette.”
According to Chief DesignerJohn Cafaro, many of the customers that had been interviewed stated that they were concerned the new Corvette would “look like a Ferrari or an (Acura) NSX.” This presented genuine challenges for the C5 design team and its leading designers and engineers. After all, earlier iterations of the Corvette had been the creative byproduct of a small group of talented designers.
Now, with the focus of the design being based, at least in part, on the input of the consumer, designers were given more restrictions than ever before and had to make sure that the design paid attention to “the voice of the customer.”
That August, the C5 program was subjected to whatGeneral Motorscalled its “Concept Alternatives Selection.” For GM engineers and designers, this phase of the design was the point at which every component, procedure, and design aspect is presented, defended, and decided on. The C5 passed this selection review process, but everyone behind the new Corvette knew that the worst was yet to come. BecauseGMwas now focused on producing “customer driven” vehicles, it was no longer enough toproduce a well engineered/well designed car, but would also require producing a car that would have immediate commercial appeal and produce sales numbers that could drive revenue and help increase sales.
Chevy held a marketing clinic in Los Angeles in May1994, to determine how well the new Corvette might ultimately sell. Even those within the Corvette program that were leery ofGeneral Motorsmarket-research-driven approach to the car’s design could not argue with the results: Sixty percent of the respondents interviewed stated that they’d buy the C5 Corvette over the competition. This singular result provided a level of acceptance no GM car had ever before received during pre-launch testing.
With the results of the marketing clinic behind them,General Motorsproceeded with development of the first, formal C5 test car. On June 4, 1994, that car was completed and build chief John Fehlberg was given the distinct honor of being the first person to drive it. This car would later be subjected to a number of additional studies - aerodynamics, durability, drivability - and so on, providing information that would allow Corvette engineers to further refine the design. Using that data, GM started building the first of a relatively small group of C5 beta test cars in April,1995and each would begin road testing shortly thereafter.
These beta test-mules were driven extensively, but not without a considerable amount of heavy camouflage to help conceal the design. General Motorsknew that there was no practical way to test these cars without putting them on the open road - but they also realized that magazine spy photographers would stake out the places where the Corvettes would be test-driven. To conceal the actual shape and aesthetics of the C5 Corvette, many of the beta cars received various soft and hard body pieces that made the C5 look like something other than aCorvette.
Despite their efforts, the early beta cars were still well photographed along drive routes that included mountains, deserts, snow-covered back roads and more - many of these contained within GM’s Mesa, Arizona proving grounds! More than a year later, the first pre-pilot C5 Corvettes rolled off the assembly line in August,1996and the first production1997Corvette was completed on October 1 of that same year. The C5 Corvette would be formally unveiled to the press in November, while an official on-sale date was set for March 7, 1997. When finally introduced at Detroit’sNorth American International Auto Showon January 6,1997, the first publicly displayed C5 represented Chevrolet’s first truly all-new Corvette since the original was introduced at the1953Motoramamore than 30 years earlier, and even then, the1953 Corvettefeatured many components already found in other Chevrolet passenger cars.
This new Corvette truly was essentially an all-new machine. There were some exceptions of course, as the Corvette engineers had relied on the previous generation ZR1 for both inspiration and guidance. However, these carryovers were far and few between, and, while the ZR1 may have influenced aspects of the C5’s design, the new Corvette was an almost complete departure from its predecessor. Further, it contained 1,500 fewer parts than theC4 Corvette. This reduction in components came about as part of the designer’s plan to reduce/eliminate the shakes, rattles and rolls that plagued theC4 Corvette. Fewer pieces also simplified production and maintenance. It was clear almost immediately, that the new C5 Corvette was going to be an overwhelming success both in the eyes of the critics and the enthusiasts alike.
How could it not be? Almost every aspect of the new Corvette was a significant improvement from its predecessors. The new C5 featured enhanced ride quality with the introduction of a substantially wider wheelbase – more than eight inches wider than theC4. A more rigid frame/chassis featuring a pair of light, but immensely strong hydro-formed rails, resulted in a design that was so stiff, it could support the new fiberglass body, even as a convertible (an option that would arrive in the second model year of the C5 Corvette) with the rigidity of a standard steel sedan.
The introduction of the trans-axle drive system for theGM 4L60E automatic transmissionresulted in better weight distribution and allowed for additional space in the co*ckpit foot wells, a significant shortcoming of theC4generation Corvette. Even theLS1 engine, though still an aluminum small-block 350, was forty-four pounds lighter and was 45 horsepower stronger than theLT1 enginethat had preceded it.
